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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MUNICIPAL
ADVOCACY IN STATEWIDE REFERENDUM
CAMPAIGNS
Municipal governments regularly communicate ideas and
information to their citizens at the public expense. When
municipal speakers engage in unchecked political advocacy,
however, their speech may arouse serious objections. Al-
though few citizens would disapprove of a mayor's occasional
exhortations against littering, for example, all citizens would
feel outraged if municipal government officials spent the entire
city budget to promote their own reelection.
Although some courts and commentators have recognized
the dangers which government speakers may present to dem-
ocratic values,' none have articulated a satisfactory theory to
distinguish between permissible and impermissible municipal
governmental speech. Theories of local government law have
largely ignored municipal speech; theories of free expression,
on the other hand, have largely sought to define the limits of
government control over individual and corporate speakers. 2
When taxpayers challenge a municipality's expenditure to in-
fluence a statewide referendum election, the need for a thor-
oughgoing analysis of municipal speech becomes particularly
acute. Courts adjudicating such challenges must balance the
values potentially endangered by a municipality's politically
partisan speech against the countervailing rights of citizens to
hear information about referendum issues and the rights of
municipal employees and officials to express opinions on mat-
ters of public interest.
This Note will analyze the constitutionality of municipal
advocacy in statewide referendum campaigns. Part I will ex-
amine the mode of analysis which state courts have tradition-
' See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. No. i, 459
F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978). For commentary discussing constitutional issues raised
by governmental speech, see generally 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COM-
MUNICATIONS 723-97 (1947); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION 697-76, 563-92, 623-26 (1970); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-4 (1978); Finman & Macaulay, Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and
the Words of Public Officials, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 632; Tribe, Toward A Metatheory
of Free Speech, io Sw. U.L. REV. 237, 244 (1978); Van Alstyne, The First Amendment
and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in the United States: Comments
And Footnotes, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 530, 531-36 (1966).
2 See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (i960); Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Scanlon, A Theory of
Freedom of Expression, I PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 204 (2972).
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ally used to adjudicate this issue - an approach which has
focused not on first amendment issues but on questions of local
government law. Part II will focus on the Supreme Court's
reasoning in two recent decisions - Buckley v. Valeo 3 and
First National Bank v. Bellotti4 - and the second, constitu-
tional mode of analysis which those decisions have suggested
to courts evaluating municipal referendum advocacy. Part HI
will discuss the pivotal case of Anderson v. City of Boston,5
a Massachusetts decision illustrating the fundamental conflict
between the theories discussed in the first two Parts. Part IV
will explore yet a third mode of analysis, which the Anderson
court suggested might resolve this conflict - an analysis based
on the rights of dissenting taxpayers not to finance government
viewpoints with which they disagree. The first four Parts
jointly argue that no existing mode of analysis has correctly
determined when and how municipal governments may per-
missibly speak in statewide referendum campaigns. Part V
will contend that the constitutional doctrine which ultimately
decides this issue can be found in Supreme Court decisions
defining the government's proper role in the electoral proc-
ess. The Note will conclude by suggesting how courts may
frame a constitutional decree to regulate municipal referendum
advocacy in the future.
I. THE POSITIVISTIC APPROACH TO MUNICIPAL
ELECTORAL ADVOCACY
Courts adjudicating challenges to municipal spending in
statewide election campaigns have traditionally attempted to
determine first whether such spending is within the munici-
pality's powers under state law. 6 Their analysis has proceeded
from the central tenet of local government law: municipalities
are creatures of the state.7 That principle limits a municipal-
ity's powers to those either expressly granted by the state
constitution or a state statute or those necessarily implied in
any expressly conferred powers. 8 A second rule of local gov-
3 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
4 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
5 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 38o N.E.2d 628 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.s.
xo6o (979).
6 See cases cited notes 12-I5, 17-20 infra.
7 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. i6r, 178-79 (907).
' See N.J. Good Humor, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 124 N.J.L. z62, 164, x1 A.2d
113, 115 (N.J. 1940). See generally i C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 2.00 (1975). Municipal corporations possess a third class of powers - those essential
and indispensable to their existence and functioning - which is closely related to the
doctrine of corporate purpose. See note ii infra. Courts are bound to construe a
Vol. 93:535
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ernment law forbids municipalities from appropriating public
funds to pursue even activities authorized by state law unless
those activities serve some "public purpose." 9 Under these
"positivistic" principles, a municipality's right to speak is thus
derived solely from the powers granted to it by the state.
This positivistic approach requires a court evaluating a
challenge to a municipality's campaign spending to search state
law for specific legislative authorization or disapproval of that
"speech." '0 The court is obliged to ask two questions: whether
the city can explicitly derive or fairly imply the power to speak
from a legislative grant, and whether the speech itself serves
some public or municipal purpose. 1" When a state statute
explicitly authorizes a particular form of municipal expression,
however, courts have often been willing to presume the exist-
ence of a public purpose. 12  When state legislation has not
specifically referred to a particular type of municipal expres-
sion, courts have sometimes inverted the test to find that state
law has or has not impliedly authorized a municipal act be-
cause that act would or would not serve a public purpose. 13
municipality's implied powers strictly, resolving all fair doubts about the existence of
a particular power against the local government. See, e.g., Beazley v. DeKalb
County, 21o Ga. 41, 43, 77 S.E.2d 740, 742 (I953); Father Basil's Lodge, Inc. v.
City of Chicago, 393 Ill. 246, 252, 65 N.E.2d 805, 810 (1946). See generally I C.
ANTIEAU, supra, §§ 5.o--.03. The implied powers of home rule municipalities, how-
ever, who may exercise powers "not inconsistent with" their states' constitutions or
general laws, see, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. LXXXIX, § 6 (amended 1966), are gen-
erally construed more broadly than those of nonhome rule municipal corporations.
See generally r C. ANTIEAU, supra, § 3.00-.40.
9 The public purpose doctrine evolved from common law, see, e.g., Town of Gila
Bend v. Wailed Lake Door Co., 107 Ariz. 545, 490 P.2d 551 (1971); Sharpless v.
Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 59 A.D. 759 (1853), and has now been recognized
in state constitutional clauses requiring that taxes be levied only for public purposes,
see, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § I. See generally 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 8,
§ iSA.o6 (1973); I5 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39.19
(3d rev. ed. 1970).
10 The term "municipal speech" shall be used throughout this Note to refer to
publicly funded messages disseminated to citizens by officials, employees, or agencies
of municipal governments.
11 In some states, the public purpose limitation is supplemented by the closely
related requirement that a municipal expenditure aid an identifiable corporate or
municipal purpose - one traditionally or necessarily connected with the purpose for
which the local government was established. See, e.g., East Tenn. Univ. v. Mayor
of Knoxville, 65 Tenn. (6 Baxter) i66, r72 (1873).
'" See, e.g., City of Jacksonville v. Oldham, 1i1 Fla. 502, 150 So. 619 (i933)
(after state legislature passed statute authorizing municipal advertising, advertising
held a municipal purpose); Connolly v. Beverly, II Mass. 437, 24 N.E. 404 (89o)
(after statutory authorization, town held empowered to lobby before state legislature).
13 See, e.g., In re Carrick, 127 N.J.L. 316, 22 A.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (municipal
officers have implied power to spend public funds to present voters with views against
proposed legislation because legislation would threaten city's future); Shannon v. City
X98o]
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Thus, the positivistic approach frequently reduces in practice
to the search for a public purpose.
In this search, courts usually defer to existing legislative
determinations of public purpose. 14  When a state legislature
neither authorizes a particular form of municipal speech nor
explicitly states what constitutes a valid public purpose, how-
ever, the state law doctrines of "implied power" and "public
purpose" offer courts an inadequate theory of municipal
speech. In such cases, the positivistic approach presents the
judge with two choices: either to defer to the municipal leg-
islature's definition of public purpose or to decide for himself
whether the challenged municipal speech serves a public pur-
pose. The first option effectively leaves the municipal legis-
lature to judge its own case.15 The second option grants the
judge unfettered discretion to apply his own values to deter-
mine whether a municipal right to speak exists. 16 Either result
violates the positivistic theory's central premise: that only state
statutory law can determine when cities may speak.
Furthermore, state court decisions evaluating municipal
attempts to use public funds to influence elections have dem-
onstrated that a positivistic approach produces inconsistent
results. While many judges have invalidated partisan munic-
ipal speech for lack of express 17 or implied" authority or for
of Huron, 9 S.D. 356, 69 N.W. 598 (1896) (city has no implied power to incur
indebtedness in campaign to become state capital because object of campaign serves
no public or corporate purpose).
14 See, e.g., City of Jacksonville v. Oldham, 112 Fla. 502, 15o So. 61g (1933).
's In City Affairs Comm. v. Board of Comm'rs, 134 N.J.L. i8o, 46 A.2d 425
(N.J. 1946), noted in 59 HARV. L. REv. 1172 (1946), for example, a city's governing
body authorized the expenditure of municipal funds for statewide newspaper adver-
tisements and radio addresses urging defeat of a proposed state constitutional amend-
ment. The state's highest court upheld the municipal action on the ground that the
public purpose doctrine requires courts to correct only those municipal legislative
actions which are arbitrary or capricious. 134 N.J.L. at i82, 46 A.2d at 427.
16 "The determination of what is and what is not a public purpose . . . initially
is for the legislature, but in the final analysis . . . must rest with the courts." Visina
v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 184, 89 N.W.2d 635, 643 (X958). For a persuasive
argument that judges' own values are unacceptable as sources of normative values,
see Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term - Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. I, 16-22 (,978).
'7 See, e.g., State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Superior Court, 93 Wash. 267, x6o P.
755 (I9x6); cf. Stanson v. Mott, I7 Cal. 3d 206, 55I P.2d i, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976)
(state agency cannot spend public funds to promote partisan position in state bond
issue without explicit legislative authorization); accord, Miller v. Miller, 87 Cal. App.
3d 762, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct. App. X978).
1s See, e.g., Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927), discussed at note
62 infra; cf. Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 2975)
(state division of human rights has no implied authority to spend public funds to
support passage of state equal rights amendment).
[Vol. 93:535
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lack of public or municipal purpose, 19 others have found these
elements present and thus condoned such municipal expres-
sion. 20 Such inconsistent results have flowed inevitably from
the absence of a consistent judicial definition of public pur-
pose. 2 1 Because courts have understood that public purposes
will likely change over time, they have not felt bound to
disallow, under the rule of stare decisis, municipal expendi-
tures which previously have been prohibited. 2 2 Some courts
have simply conceded that the public purpose concept "defies
absolute definition."' 23  As applied, the positivistic approach
has thus proved so malleable as to defy prediction.
The positivistic approach provides guidance only when the
state legislature has spoken clearly and explicitly concerning
the municipal speech at issue. It is a theory of narrow appli-
cation. Furthermore, such an approach does not even pretend
to address the federal constitutional questions that municipal
speech may raise. Its only axiom - that cities may speak
only when states say they can - recognizes no limit on the
type or amount of municipal expression which states may
expressly authorize. Thus, the positivistic approach cannot
help in building a larger theory of governmental speech that
would apply to state and federal, as well as municipal, gov-
ernmental expression.
19 See, e.g., Elsenau v. City of Chicago, 334 fll. 78, 165 N.E. 129 (1929); cf. Sims
v. Moeur, 41 Ariz. 486, 19 P.2d 679 (1933) (industrial commission's public expenditure
for campaign against proposed repeal of state workmen's compensation law did not
serve a purpose for which commission was created).
20 See, e.g., City Affairs Comm. v. Board of Comm'rs, 132 N.J.L. 552, 41 A.2d
798 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (municipality deemed to have implied power to use public funds
to advocate rejection of a referendum measure), aff'd, 134 N.J.L. 18o, 46 A.2d 425
(N.J. 1946) (on grounds that municipal action served a public purpose).
Some courts have similarly found municipalities powerless to lobby before national
or state legislatures without an express statutory grant, see, e.g., Valentine v. Rob-
ertson, 3oo F. 521 (9th Cir. 1924); Chicago Park Dist. v. Herczel & Co., 373 Ill. 325,
26 N.E.2d 119 (1940), while others have held that municipalities have an implied
power to lobby even without such a grant, see, e.g., Farrel v. Town of Derby, 58
Conn. 234, 20 A. 460 (1889).
21 Compare City Affairs Comm. v. Board of Comm'rs, 134 N.J.L. 18o, 182, 46
A.2d 425, 427 (N.J. 1946) ("the promotion . . . of the 'general welfare, security,
prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents' of the municipality"),
with Shields v. City of Philadelphia, 405 Pa. 6oo, 603, 176 A.2d 697, 698 (1962)
(particular improvement may serve a public purpose even without a considerable part
of the community enjoying its benefits).
22 See, e.g., City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 16, 136 A.2d 852, 855
(1957); State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman, 155 Ohio St. 320, 326-27, 98 N.E.2d
835, 839 (I95I). See generally is E. McQUILLIN, supra note 9, § 39.19.
23 Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 15, 98 A.2d 523, 527 (1953). See
also Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 447, 105 A.2d 614, 619
(1954).
198o]
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II. THE FORMALISTIC APPROACH TO MUNICIPAL
ELECTORAL ADVOCACY
The Supreme Court has never expressly defined the extent
of a municipality's first amendment rights. 24 Two recent first
amendment decisions, Buckley v. Valeo25 and First National
Bank v. Bellotti,26 could, however, be read together to suggest
that municipal corporations have broad autonomy to spend
money to disseminate political messages in statewide referen-
dum campaigns.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court found that expenditure
ceilings imposed by federal statute on candidates campaigning
for federal office violated the first amendment's guarantee of
free expression and association. 27 "[B]ecause virtually every
means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires
the expenditure of money,"' 28 the Court determined that the
statutory limits on private political spending directly restrained
the quantity and diversity of political expression. 29 The Court
concluded, therefore, that any attempt to limit those expend-
itures should be subjected to exacting first amendment scru-
tiny. 30
Two years later, in Bellotti, the Court went beyond Buck-
ley to suggest that the first amendment's protection of expend-
itures for political expression does not depend on the identity
of the speaker. 31 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
had upheld a state statute banning spending by business cor-
porations intended to influence any state referendum not "ma-
terially affecting" corporate property, business, or assets. 32
While conceding that corporations have some first amendment
24 In City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.7 (1976), the Supreme Court explicitly refrained from
deciding "whether a municipal corporation as an employer has First Amendment
rights to hear the views of its citizens and employees." One commentator has simply
asserted that "[tlhe government or polity ...has no first amendment rights." Ely,
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1505 (1975).
25 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
26 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
27 424 U.S. at 14-15, 39-59 (considering constitutionality of various provisions of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197r, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified in scattered sections of 2, i8, 47 U.S.C.)).
28 424 U.S. at ig.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 6.
31 435 U.S. at 777.
32 First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262 (1977)
(upholding MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1976)).
[Vol. 93:535
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rights, 33 the Massachusetts court decided that the fourteenth
amendment did not bar the state legislature from defining
those rights narrowly. 34
The Supreme Court rejected the state court's analysis and
struck down the law. 35 Writing for the majority, Justice Pow-
ell declared that "[t]he proper question . . . is not whether
corporations 'have' First Amendment rights," but whether the
state ban on corporate expenditures "abridges expression that
the First Amendment was meant to protect."' 36 Expression
does not lose protection merely because it stems from a cor-
porate source. 37 Because Buckley had held that courts should
scrutinize regulation of expenditures for political speech as
carefully as regulation of speech itself,38 the Bellotti Court
strictly scrutinized Massachusetts' restriction on corporate po-
litical spending. It then found that the state's chosen means
were poorly tailored to protect the state's asserted compelling
interests. 39
The Court's reasoning in Buckley and Bellotti could be
used to support a constitutional argument that the first amend-
ment protects municipal speech. By suggesting that the first
amendment protects political speech from any source, Bellotti's
reasoning directs courts examining legislative or judicial bans
on municipal electoral expenditures to determine initially
whether those bans restrict political speech. Buckley's reason-
ing implies that a city's political speech includes its expendi-
tures to express views on political issues. 40 A court would
thus be obliged to subject to exacting scrutiny any means by
which a state regulated such expenditures and to find those
means unconstitutional if they did not represent the least re-
strictive alternative available to protect compelling state inter-
ests.
4 1
33 37, Mass. at 785, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
34 Id.
3S 435 U.S. at 795-
36 Id. at 776.
37 Id. at 777.
31 Id. at 786 n.23 (citing Buckley). See also note 30 supra.
39 The state asserted compelling interests in preventing corporate domination of
the political process and in safeguarding the rights of dissenting shareholders. 435
U.S. at 788-89, 792-93. Without disputing the importance of these interests, the
Bellotti majority concluded that the first was not at stake because the record showed
no present threat of corporate domination of elections, id. at 789-90, and that the
state ban was poorly tailored to serve the second interest, being both under- and over-
inclusive. Id. at 793-95. But see id. at 81o-ii, 812-20 (White, J., dissenting).
40 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. i, i6 (1976) (per curiam).
41 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (2968). See generally
Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
I98o]
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Despite its superficial appeal, such a reading of Buckley
and Bellotti proves overly formalistic. 42  From Bellotti, this
approach deduces that the first amendment protects disembod-
ied political speech rather than the rights of particular speak-
ers. 43  From Buckley, it deduces that the first amendment
protects the money that finances political speech as a means
of protecting the speech itself. 44 By combining these two
premises, the formalistic approach not only treats all political
speakers as equally protected, but also renders the power of a
municipal corporation to spend in a referendum campaign effec-
tively coextensive with the constitutional right of an individual
to speak. In the process it ignores two simple realities: that
the right to spend differs from the right to speak and that
municipal governments are not ordinary political speakers.
An individual's right to speak and his right to spend are
related but conceptually distinct. 45 A spectrum of four hypo-
42 Formalistic analysis is generally "equated with rule application, deductive think-
ing, and the bringing of particulars under universal categories." Paine, Commentary:
Instrumentalism v. Formalism: Dissolving the Dichotomy, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 997.
13 The Bellotti Court's decision to emphasize the constitutional protection due a
particular type of speech rather than the constitutional rights of particular speakers
has already created practical difficulties in the realm of commercial speech. The
Burger Court has offered no principle to separate corporate political speech, which
Bellotti deemed worthy of the most exacting first amendment protection, from cor-
porate commercial speech, which the Court has accorded somewhat lesser protec-
tion. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979) (upholding constitutionality
of state statute prohibiting practice of optometry under a trade name). Ad hoc
decisionmaking has resulted. Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978) (state may constitutionally prohibit lawyer's commercial solicitation of
client), with In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (state may not reprimand lawyer for
soliciting when she acts not for financial gain, but to further political objectives of
legal services organization). When a corporation's political speech also serves its
business objectives - for example, when a soft drink company advertises to defeat
a state "bottle bill" - the Court's analysis in no way determines what level of
constitutional protection should be accorded that speech.
44 Academic commentators and judges alike have sharply criticized the Buckley
Court's decision to protect money as strictly as speech simply because political speech
often entails expenditure of money. As Professor Freund noted shortly after Buckley
was decided: "We know that money talks; but that is the problem, not the answer,"
quoted in Lewis, The Court on Politics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1976, at A31, col. 3.
See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 263 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); L. TRIBE, supra note I, § 13-27; Freund, Commentary, in FED-
ERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE 72, 74 (A. Rosenthal ed. 1972) (arguing
that limits on voluntary contributions are no less constitutional than regulations
imposed on a soundtruck's decibel level), reprinted in 3 STUDIES IN MONEY IN
POLITICS study no. 18 (H. Alexander ed. 1974); Leventhal, Courts and Political
Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 345, 359- 6 2 (1977); Wright, Politics and the Consti-
tution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976) (attacking Buckley's de facto
equation between money and speech).
4- See' Freund, supra note 44, at 72 ("The right to speak is . . . more central to
the values envisaged by the First Amendment than the right to spend.").
[Vol. 93:535
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thetical cases illustrates the distinction. Suppose an individual,
A, publicly expresses approval or disapproval of a referendum
question; the first amendment would unequivocally protect A's
right to speak. Suppose now that a friend voluntarily contrib-
uted money to A, so that A could disseminate his political
viewpoint more widely. The amount of money which A chose
to spend would indicate only how intensely he held his
ideas. 46 A regulation restricting A's expenditure of that money
would in no way disturb the content of his ideas; thus, a court
might find such a noncontent-based restriction constitutional
if first amendment "balancing" revealed that the restriction
served governmental interests which outweighed that regula-
tion's inhibiting effect on communicative activity. 47 Now
suppose that in a third case many otherwise unaffiliated per-
sons chose to pool their money, then authorized A to spend
that money for their mutual financial benefit. If A chose to
spend the money to disseminate his own political viewpoint in
a referendum campaign, the amount of money he expended
would indicate neither how many of the individuals supported
that view, nor how intensely any of them held it. While A's
individual right to speak would be as protected as before, he
could not claim that his expenditure furthered any first amend-
ment rights of his "contributors" unless he could show that
many or all of them had consented to the specific expression
he had proposed. 48 Finally, suppose that in a fourth case, A
46 See Wright, supra note 44, at O9ig (arguing that an individual's expenditure of
"[mioney may register intensities ...but money by itself communicates no ideas").
47 See generally L. TRIBE, supra note I, § I2-2o; Ely, supra note 24, at 1496-
502. This reasoning suggests that, Buckley notwithstanding, some restrictions on
expenditures of voluntarily contributed money could survive constitutional scrutiny.
See also note 44 supra.
48 This analysis suggests a fundamental flaw in the Supreme Court's first amend-
ment analysis in Bellotti. The Bellotti majority based its decision to protect corporate
political speech strictly, regardless of its source, on an "instrumental view" of the first
amendment. That view, usually associated with Professor Meiklejohn, deems political
speech deserving of constitutional protection primarily because it is "indispensable to
[political] decisionmaking in a democracy." See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 777 & n.ii (I978). See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 2. Such a limited
view of the first amendment, however, underemphasizes the intrinsic value of speech
in the "evolution, definition, and proclamation of individual and group identity." L.
TRIBE, supra note I, § 12-1, at 578. See also T. EMERSON, supra note i, at 6.
When an individual speaks, safeguarding the speech upholds his right to the self-
expression manifested in his choice of both the form and the content of his message.
When corporations "speak," however, protecting their expenditure need not necessarily
safeguard the expressive rights of any individuals other than the corporation's direc-
tors. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-o5 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting). The Supreme Court's analysis in Bellotti proves formalistic because it
cannot distinguish between those situations where a corporate body communicates a
political message on behalf of all of its members with their specific and immediate
198o]
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coerced many individuals to give him money, then used the
funds to disseminate his views about a referendum to an au-
dience which included his "contributors." In such a case, it
is unclear why the first amendment's protection for A's right
to speak should also condone his expenditure of coerced money
to amplify his voice. 49 Although these four situations seem
intuitively different, in each case the formalistic approach calls
for the strictest scrutiny of any regulation on A's expenditures.
If A were not a private individual, but a municipal official,
his speech would present another difficulty. The first amend-
ment recognizes not only the intrinsic value of speech in de-
fining individual and group identity, but also the instrumental
value of speech in a democratic society.5 0 By recognizing the
special value of political speech, 51 the first amendment seeks
both to protect the flow of information in the marketplace of
ideas and to preserve private control of political discussion.5 2
Unlike individual or corporate speech, municipal speech in-
volves direct government intrusion into the dialogue surround-
ing the political process.5 3 Any principled analysis of munic-
ipal speech must therefore decide when such governmental
intrusion into the machinery of democracy is or is not legiti-
mate. A theory which mechanically applies overly broad rules
consent, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and those situations in
which a few individuals commanding an organization use other people's money and
labor to amplify their own voices. To claim that its speech furthers the associational
rights of its members, a corporate body must show that relations within the organi-
zation are personal, participation is voluntary, contributions are uncoerced, and in-
ternal self-corrective processes are free and open. See T. EMERSON, supra note x, at
681-82; P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 91 (i968). In Bellotti, however, the
Court chose simply to grant corporate speech exacting protection without examining
any of these factors.
49
The means by which a donor acquires funds which are given to finance political
expression is one step further removed from the expression itself .... Surely,
the First Amendment does not justify the stealing of funds or of a printing
press because the defendant was planning to use [them] to publish his views
on a subject of public concern.
Anderson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 2314 n.15, 380 N.E.2d 628,
637 n.15 (1978) (emphasis added).
sO See note 48 supra.
S' See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 4or U.S. 265, 272 (197); Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
52 "In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but
the people - individually as citizens ... and collectively as associations . . . - who
must retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a
political campaign." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976) (per curiam).
11 See pp. 555-57 infra.
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cannot provide such distinctions.5 4  Like the positivistic ap-
proach, the formalistic approach thus proves inadequate to
analyze the constitutionality of municipal referendum advo-
cacy.
m. Anderson v. City of Boston
Only a few months after Bellotti was decided, the positiv-
istic and formalistic theories clashed for the first time in An-
derson v. City of Boston.5 5 Like Bellotti, Anderson grew out
of a government perception that corporate spending to influ-
ence a referendum result might drown out the voices of indi-
vidual voters.5 6  Since Bellotti had barred the Massachusetts
legislature from outlawing corporate referendum expenditures,
in the next statewide referendum the city of Boston sought
directly to counteract corporate expression. The mayor and
city council committed municipal employees, public facilities,
and $1.3 million in tax revenues to a campaign urging passage
of a state constitutional amendment opposed by business cor-
porations.5 7 When eleven taxpayers challenged the appropri-
ation,58 the city argued that any judicial restriction on its
constitutionally protected "speech" would constitute a forbid-
den prior restraint.5 9  Nevertheless, a unanimous Massachu-
54 See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. i685, 1697 (I976) (arguing that formalistic rules inevitably prove over- and
under-inclusive).
5s 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S.
io6o (,979).
56 Brief for Defendants at io-ii, Anderson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh.
2297, 380 N.E.2d 628 (,978).
57 Brief for Plaintiffs at 2-5.
The November 1978 Massachusetts election ballot included a referendum question
proposing a state constitutional amendment. This so-called "Classification Amend-
ment" would have authorized municipalities to assess real property at different per-
centages of fair market value for purposes of differential taxation. Boston's mayor
and city council concluded that without the amendment, tax burdens would shift from
commercial to residential property, thus "doubl[ing] the tax burden on many single
family homes in the City." Brief for Defendants at 5. A 5-4 majority of the city
council passed an ordinance allocating tax revenues to a campaign to disseminate
educational materials and information urging adoption of the amendment. Brief for
Plaintiffs at 3-4. To run the campaign, the City Council retained two private con-
sulting firms and established an office of public information directed and staffed by
municipal employees. Id.
-8 A state statute permitted io or more taxable inhabitants of the city to go into
equity to enjoin illegal expenditures contemplated by their local government. MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 53 (West Supp. 1979).
59 Brief for Defendants at 36-39.
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setts Supreme Judicial Court issued a detailed injunction reg-
ulating the city's actions. 60
Justice Wilkins, writing for the court, began by asking
whether state law authorized Boston to appropriate funds for
electioneering. 61 Finding no explicit statutory grant, the court
then read state law to bestow upon the city no'implied au-
thority to make such expenditures. The court also implied
that the appropriation served no public purpose. 62
The city's novel assertion of a first amendment claim pre-
vented the court from disposing of the case solely on positiv-
istic grounds. Buckley and Bellotti notwithstanding, Justice
Wilkins rejected the formalistic assumption that the city's ex-
penditures constituted protected political speech.6 3 Instead, he
assumed such protection arguendo, 64 then asked whether the
state law barring the city's speech could survive strict scru-
tiny. 65 Asserting that the state had "compelling interest[s] in
assuring the fairness of elections and the appearance of fairness
in the electoral process"' 66 and "in assuring that a dissenting
minority of taxpayers ... not [be] compelled to finance expres-
60 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2320-24, 380 N.E.2d at 640-42. The court's order
enjoined the city from using any appropriated funds to influence the vote on the
referendum question. While conceding that some policymakers would be free to act
and speak in favor of the amendment, the court declared that no municipal employee
could be compelled to do so. It further required that advocates of each side of the
election issue be granted equal access to city facilities, equipment and supplies. Id.
61 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2302-09, 380 N.E.2d at 632-35.
62 Id. at 2307 n.Io, 380 N.E.2d 634 n.io. The court avoided deciding whether
the appropriation served a public purpose, but conceded that "there may well be
situations in which a public purpose would be served by municipal advocacy." Id.
In those situations, the court declared it would defer to legislative findings of a public
purpose. Id. See pp. 537-38 supra.
To this point, the Anderson court's reasoning closely resembled that of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927). In
Mines, a taxpayer sued the city's public service commissioners for publicly financing
an advertising campaign urging approval of a bond issue to enlarge the city's power
system. The defendants alleged that private companies opposing the bond issue had
already engaged in a massive publicity campaign to defeat it. Nevertheless, the court
held for the plaintiff, noting that expenditure of public monies was unjustified even
"for the purpose of correcting the misinformation [already] disseminated" "unless the
power to do so is given to said board in clear and unmistakable language." Id. at
287, 257 P. at 537. The second half of the Mines holding, permitting defendants to
be held personally liable to repay public funds improperly expended for campaign
purposes, has been overruled by Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130
Cal. Rptr. 697 (I976).
63 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2314 n.I5, 38o N.E.2d at 637 n.15.
64 Id. at 2314, 380 N.E.2d at 637-38.
65 Id., 380 N.E.2d at 638.
66 Id. at 2315, 38o N.E.2d at 638.
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sion on an election issue of views with which they disagree," 67
the court concluded the state could withhold authorization
even from municipal expenditures strictly protected by the first
amendment. 68
The Anderson court's facile conclusion that state law barred
municipal speech merely underscores the indeterminacy of the
positivistic approach when applied to municipal speech neither
expressly authorized nor prohibited by state law. 69 Though
the court could find no reference to the electioneering powers
of municipal corporations in Massachusetts' election law, 70 it
construed the legislature's silence "not as an indication that
municipal action to influence election results was intended to
be exempt from regulation, ' 71 but as a "manifest[ation of] an
intention to bar municipalities from engaging in the expendi-
ture of funds to influence election results.' 72 Justice Wilkins
could as easily have decided that the legislature's silence trig-
gered the state's Home Rule Amendment; such a decision
would have affirmed the city's power to decide for itself
whether or not to engage in electoral advocacy. 73 In any
event, such a questionable construction of state law should
never have survived strict first amendment scrutiny. For if
67 Id. at 2319, 380 N.E.2d at 639.
68 Id.
69 See pp. 538-39 supra.
70 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 23o6, 38o N.E.2d at 634. The court primarily searched
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55 (West Supp. 1977), the law partially invalidated in
Bellotti. Id. See pp. 540-41 & note 32 supra.
7' 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2306, 38o N.E.2d at 634.
72 Id. at 2305, 380 N.E.2d at 633. Had the legislature expected or intended that
cities influence elections, Justice Wilkins declared, its election law "would have reg-
ulated those activities as well." Id. at 2306, 380 N.E.2d at 634.
73 The Home Rule Amendment, MAss. CONST. art. LXXXIX, § 6 (amended
1966), granted Boston the authority to exercise any powers and functions "not incon-
sistent with" the state's constitution or laws. See note 8 supra. The Anderson court
could have declared itself bound by the terms of the Home Rule Amendment to allow
the city to act as it wished, simply because state law had not explicitly disallowed
municipal referendum advocacy.
Alternatively, had the Supreme Court in Bellotti not explicitly rejected the Mas-
sachusetts legislature's "materially affecting" test for business corporations' expression,
see pp. 540-41 supra, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court could plausibly
have construed state election law to grant municipal corporations only the right to
speak on issues "materially affecting" municipal "business, property, and assets."
Justice Powell foreclosed that possibility in Bellotti, however, by declaring that the
first amendment could not permit state legislatures to "channel the expression of
views" in this manner: "If a legislature may direct business corporations to 'stick to
business,' it also may limit other corporations - religious, charitable, or civic - to
their respective 'business' when addressing the public." First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 785 (,978) (emphasis added).
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first amendment interests are truly at stake, 74 a statute making
no mention of municipal advocacy cannot be construed to
prohibit protected speech without running afoul of the over-
breadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines. 75
In retrospect, the Supreme Judicial Court's confusion in
Anderson can be viewed as the inevitable result of a war
between theories. 76 The court attempted to evaluate Boston's
74 Although the court had assumed arguendo that the municipal expenditure was
as fully protected as political speech, see p. 546 supra, Justice Wilkins did not hide
his suspicion "that the First Amendment has nothing to do with this intrastate
question." 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2313, 380 N.E.2d at 637.
75 A law is void on its face for overbreadth if it "does not aim specifically at evils
within the allowable area of [government] control but . . . sweeps within its ambit
other activities that . . . constitute an exercise" of protected first amendment rights.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940). See generally Note, The First Amend-
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970). A law is void on its face
for vagueness if it is worded so vaguely that persons "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 2O9 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (i96o).
The Anderson court's strict scrutiny in effect amounted only to "ends scrutiny,"
which failed to test the closeness of fit between the asserted compelling state interests
and the means "chosen" by the legislature to protect those interests. In Bellotti,
however, the Supreme Court had explicitly held that Massachusetts could not protect
nearly identical compelling interests by loosely tailored means. See note 39 supra.
76 This confusion apparently afflicted the Supreme Court's disposition of Anderson
as well. Justice Brennan granted Boston's application for a stay of the state court's
injunction order, reasoning that the city should not be gagged when, after "Bellotti,
corporate industrial and commercial opponents of the referendum are free to finance
their opposition." City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389, 2390 (1978). The full
Court, however, denied the taxpayers' motion to vacate the stay order by a vote of
6-3. Anderson v. City of Boston, 439 U.S. 951 (1978). Justice Stevens, dissenting
from the denial, argued that the city's first amendment claims were "frivolous,"
because the Massachusetts court had legitimately resolved the dispute on state law
grounds. Id. at 951-52. The full Court apparently accepted Justice Stevens' inter-
pretation, for when the city appealed for plenary review, the Court summarily dis-
missed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question. City of Boston v.
Anderson, 439 U.S. Io6o (1979) (Brennan, Blackmun, & Powell, JJ., voting to note
probable jurisdiction).
The Court's summary disposition raises more questions than it answers. Paradox-
ically, Justices White and Marshall and Chief Justice Burger voted both to uphold
Justice Brennan's stay and to deny Boston's appeal; thus it remains unclear whether
a majority of the Court agreed about what theory should apply to the case. A
summary dismissal affirms only a state court's ruling and not its reasoning. See P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 113-4 (2d ed. Supp. 2977). Thus, it
is possible that the Court disposed of the city's claim as a "novel constitutional claim[]
which, although 'substantial,' because not governed by prior case law, [was] deemed
not 'so substantial as to require plenary consideration."' Comment, The Precedential
Weight of a Dismissal by the Supreme Court for Want of a Substantial Federal
Question: Some Implications of Hicks v. Miranda, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 5o8, S18
(1976) (emphasis in original).
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speech by reference to two fundamentally incompatible ap-
proaches resting on diametrically opposite assumptions. While
the positivistic theory recognizes a municipality's right to speak
only when the state grants it the power to spend, the formal-
istic theory acknowledges a municipality's inherent power to
spend deriving from its independent constitutional right to
speak."7 Ironically, a municipality's expenditure of public
money for political expression permits taxpayer challenges un-
der the positivistic theory7 8 at the same time as it enables
municipalities to invoke first amendment protection under the
formalistic theory. Any state restriction on municipal political
speech would, by definition, be simultaneously valid under the
positivistic approach and probably unconstitutional under the
formalistic approach. A clash between the two theories nec-
essarily admits of no compromise.
Although the Anderson court's reasoning was flawed, its
conclusion still might have been constitutional. Even if mu-
nicipal speech is protected by the first amendment, a closely
tailored statute explicitly regulating municipal advocacy could
survive strict scrutiny if that statute served sufficiently com-
pelling state interests. Thus, the Anderson court's conclusion
would have been constitutionally warranted if either of the
two state interests discussed - the interest in protecting the
rights of dissenting taxpayers and the interest in preserving
the fairness and appearance of fairness of elections7 9 - proved
sufficiently compelling to justify the court's detailed decree
enjoining the speech.8 0 The next two Parts of this Note will
examine those interests.
IV. THE RIGHTS OF DISSENTING TAXPAYERS
Long before Anderson, courts invalidating municipal elec-
tioneering expenditures had asserted that dissenters should not
7 In Anderson, the City of Boston argued that municipalities are created with
independent rights of political expression derived from their citizens' right to speak
and from the rights of both their citizens and other audiences to hear. See Brief for
Defendants at 29, Anderson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 38o N.E.2d
628 (1978). It is not clear, however, why governments should be able to assert the
rights of their citizens to hear as the constitutional basis of their own right to speak,
especially if not all of those citizens are willing listeners.
7' See note 58 supra. Some states have constitutional provisions expressly author-
izing such taxpayer suits against local governments. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 16,
§ 13. See generally 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 8, § 6.48.
11 See pp. 546-47 supra.
80 See note 6o supra.
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be compelled to finance partisan municipal viewpoints."'
These decisions, however, were never explicitly based on fed-
eral constitutional grounds.8 2 While the Supreme Court has
held that governments may not force individuals to endorse or
disseminate messages which they find obnoxious,8 3 it has never
explicitly permitted dissenters to block government expres-
sion.8 4 In fact, the Court has intimated that too great a rec-
ognition of the rights of dissenters would effectively hamstring
our system of municipal governance. 85
The Anderson court suggested instead that the plight of
dissenting taxpayers might be analogized to cases in which
dissenting members of nongovernmental organizations asserted
a first amendment right not to be compelled to finance organ-
81 See, e.g., Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ., i3 N.J. 172, 98
A.2d 673 (1953); Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927).
" In Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 287, 257 P. 530, 537 (1927), the court
recognized no constitutional violations, but observed that use of public funds would
be "manifestly unfair and unjust" to dissenting electors. Similarly, in Citizens to
Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ., 13 N.J. 272, 182, 98 A.2d 673, 678 (i953),
then-New Jersey Supreme Court Justice William Brennan relied on "simple fairness
and justice" rather than constitutional precedent to bar a township board of education
from spending public money to urge passage of legislation over the objection of
dissenting voters.
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. No. x, 459 F. Supp.
357, 361 (D. Colo. 1978), decided shortly after Anderson, a federal district judge
preliminarily enjoined a school board's public relations campaign against an initiative
measure to amend the state constitution, noting that such a public expenditure "would
seem so contrary to the root philosophy of a republican form of government as might
cause this Court to resort to the guaranty clause in Article IV, Section 4 of the United
States Constitution." The guarantee clause has not, however, traditionally served as
a constitutional source of judicially enforceable private rights. See Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See generally Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article
IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1962).
83 The Supreme Court has forbidden the government to compel its citizens to
salute the flag, see West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 329 U.S. 624 (I943),
or to display ideological messages on their property, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977). See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 242
(2974) (government may not force newspaper to print undesired story even to attain
balanced presentation of electoral issues). But see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC's "equal time" doctrine).
84 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). See also id. at 720 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (government may engage in any mode of publicly funded expres-
sion which does not place citizens in the position of actually or apparently asserting
that the government's statement is true).
8s As early as 1923, the Court recognized that it needed a restrictive approach to
taxpayer standing to contain the volume of litigation against governments: "If one
taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer may do
the same." Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). The Court's standing
doctrine has thus largely continued to declare nonjusticiable taxpayer efforts to enjoin
state or federal government spending programs. See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952). But see note 134 infra. For a recent summary of the
Court's standing doctrine, see generally Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-81 (1978).
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izational expression which they found objectionable. 86 First
amendment interests of majority and minority members have
clashed in a variety of nongovernmental contexts: voluntary
associations,87 integrated bar associations, 8 8 business corpora-
tions, 89 private9" and public sector labor unions, 91 and quasi-
public utility corporations. 92 In each of these contexts, courts
have sought on the one hand to prevent dissenters from si-
lencing the majority93 without, on the other hand, permitting
the majority to ride roughshod over dissenters' interests. 94
The Supreme Court struck one such compromise in Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education.9" The majority opinion artic-
ulated what may be called the Abood principle: while dissent-
ers may not block their organization's expression, 96 they also
may not, be compelled to contribute to organizational speech
unrelated to the purposes for which the organization was cre-
ated. 97 The Court concluded in Abood that a union's use of
compelled fees to fund expression advocating political and
86 Anderson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 2319-20, 380 N.E.2d
628, 640 (i978).
87 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
s See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (g6i).
89 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
90 See, e.g., Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (r956); Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 765-70 (i961).
91 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (,977).
92 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390
N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979), probable jurisdiction noted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3189
(U.S. Oct. i, 1979) (No. 79-134); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 749, 4,7 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979), probable jurisdic-
tion noted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3350 (U.S. Nov. 27, r979) (No. 79-565). See also Note,
Utility Companies and the First Amendment: Regulating the Use of Political Inserts
in Utility Bills, 64 VA. L. REV. 921, 924-26 (1978).
93 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961).
94 In the context of private business corporations, for example, the Supreme Court
has frequently required controlling shareholders to prove good faith and due care to
minority shareholders. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (i939); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
9s 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
96 The Abood Court explicitly refused to "hold that a union cannot constitutionally
spend [union] funds for the expression of political views." Id. at 235. The first part
of the Court's dual holding thus established that a public sector employee union could
compel nonmembers to pay charges equal to union dues in order to defray the costs
of collective bargaining, without abridging their first or fourteenth amendment asso-
ciational rights.
97 Id. at 236. Prior to Abood, the Supreme Court had twice recognized the first
amendment implications of this issue, but had engaged in strained statutory construc-
tion to avoid deciding it on constitutional grounds. See Railway Employes' Dep't v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 768 (ig6i). See also id. at 775-79 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 788-91
(Black, J., dissenting). See generally Wellington, Machinists v. Street: Statutory
Interpretation And the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, ig6i SuP. CT. REv. 49.
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ideological causes "not germane to its duties as collective-bar-
gaining representative" impermissibly abridged the dissenting
employees' constitutional rights to refrain from associating with
those espousing demands and ideas with which they
disagreed. 98
An examination of the assumptions underlying Abood re-
veals that its guiding principle cannot apply in the realm of
municipal speech, for the same reason that the positivistic
approach fails to provide deterministic results: "public pur-
pose" cannot easily be defined. 99 The Abood Court assumed
that a line could be drawn between speech related and speech
unrelated to the organizational purpose of a labor union;100
courts would be hard-pressed, however, to draw the same line
when evaluating the speech of municipal corporations. While
labor unions perform a relatively specialized function and pur-
sue a limited range of goals, municipal corporations perform
a multitude of public functions and are potentially interested
in myriad domestic policy issues. 101
The concept of dissenters' rights, as defined by Abood,
cannot determine when cities may or may not advocate. An-
derson itself demonstrates this reality. The taxpayers in An-
derson argued that municipalities are created only to serve the
"public purpose," then urged the court to define the public
purpose so narrowly as to exclude municipal referendum ad-
vocacy. 10 2 The city officials, on the other hand, asserted that
municipal corporations are created to fulfill the "governmental
function." 10 3 They then defined that function so broadly as
98 431 U.S. at 235-36.
99 See pp. 538-39 supra.
100 Justice Stewart acknowledged, however, that such a line would be difficult to
draw for private sector unions and that "in the public sector the line may be somewhat
hazier." 431 U.S. at 236.
101 As Justice Powell, concurring in the Abood judgment, noted:
Compelled support of a private association is fundamentally different from
compelled support of government .... [Tihe reason for permitting the gov-
ernment to compel the payment of taxes . . . is that the government is
representative of the people. The same cannot be said of a union, which is
representative only of one segment of the population, with certain common
interests.
Id. at 259 n.13.
Abood's concern for the associational rights of dissenters also seems particularly
inapposite to municipal speech. For if dissenting taxpayers could validly argue that
paying local taxes infringed on their right not to associate, then they could use the
first amendment to justify nonpayment of any taxes which might eventually finance
municipal expression.
' See Brief for Plaintiffs at 13-17, Anderson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 2297, 38o N.E.2d 628 (,978).
103 See Brief for Defendants at 34.
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to encompass referendum advocacy. 10 4 The Anderson court
could not meaningfully apply the Abood principle to municipal
speech until it had first decided whether or not Boston's ad-
vocacy served a valid public purpose or governmental func-
tion.1 05 Yet the taxpayers' narrow definition of "public
purpose" and the city's broad definition of "governmental
function" simply reflected their differences about what the
proper role of municipal governments should be. The Ander-
son court had the same unfettered discretion to choose between
these definitions that all judges exercise when they resort to
the positivistic approach in the face of a silent state
statute. 10 6  Thus, as before, the vagueness inherent in the
concept of a municipal purpose ensured an unpredictable re-
sult. 107
Courts cannot regulate municipal speech solely by reference
to dissenters' rights. In Anderson, the taxpayers invoked those
rights in hopes of adding a constitutional dimension to their
essentially positivistic argument. The city officials, on the
other hand, refused to acknowledge that those rights can
meaningfully limit municipal advocacy. 10 8  Thus, Anderson
shows that an analysis of the rights of dissenting taxpayers
advances understanding of the constitutionality of municipal
referendum advocacy no further than either the positivistic or
the formalistic approach.
V. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS
A. The Constitutional Mandate of Neutrality
The Anderson court pointed to a second compelling state
interest justifying careful regulation of municipal speech: the
104 The City of Boston conceded that speech about "foreign policy, . .. broad law
reform, or . . . other society-wide causes" fell outside its proper function. Id. at 35.
But see 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2317 n.16, 380 N.E.2d at 639 n.16.
105 In the parallel context of shareholder democracy, Professors Brudney and
Chirelstein have argued convincingly that the rights of dissenting shareholders can
never determine when a business corporation may or may not merge and "freeze out"
dissenters, because of the inherent difficulties judges encounter when attempting to
find a "business purpose" furthered by such a merger. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978).
106 See p. 538 supra.
107 See pp. 538-39 supra.
108 Professor Laurence Tribe, Boston's counsel in Anderson, has contended that
when the government spends public money to propagate an official message, "the fact
that some people object to this expenditure of their tax money . . . is likely to be
deemed irrelevant." L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-4, at 590. In Professor Tribe's
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need to "assur[e] the fairness of elections and the appearance
of fairness in the electoral process." 10 9 While the court did
not examine the constitutional doctrine underlying this interest,
Supreme Court decisions outlining the proper role of govern-
ment in elections generally, and in the referendum process in
particular, appear based on the notion that those processes
must be zealously protected if voters are to accept their results
as legitimate. 110 Those decisions may be read as a constitu-
tional mandate of government neutrality in referendum cam-
paigns. Even if well-intentioned, a municipal government's
attempt to influence a statewide referendum through its ad-
vocacy would therefore unconstitutionally violate that princi-
ple.
Government neutrality has long been required in parallel
constitutional settings. The Framers of the Constitution ar-
gued for government neutrality in partisan elections, fearing
that incumbents would use the resources of their offices to
perpetuate themselves in power.1" The Supreme Court has
also recognized that permitting the government to depart from
a neutral position would threaten both the reliability of the
election result as an expression of the popular will and the
appearance of integrity crucial to maintaining public confi-
dence in the electoral process. 112 In adjudicating first amend-
ment claims under the religious establishment clause, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly insisted that governments speak
view, those who disagree with the government's viewpoint may not silence the gov-
ernment's voice, "nor may they insist that government give equal circulation to their
viewpoint" so long as the government speech does not threaten to drown theirs out.
Id. Recently, Professor Tribe has argued even more strongly that the "challenge of
the affirmative state" compels "the paradox that governmental action to facilitate the
expression of any idea may depend on coerced contributions from citizens who not
only reject the idea but find it deeply offensive." Tribe, supra note I, at 245.
109 See note 66 supra.
110 See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion); City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. I, io (1976) (per curiam); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 6ox, 616-17 (i973);
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
555-56 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142-43 (197); United Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-104 (1947).
'1 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 52, 53 (J. Madison); io J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 98-99 (1899) (President Jefferson).
112 The Court has explicitly recognized that the validity of elections as bona fide
expressions of the popular will depends as much upon citizens' faith that the electoral
process is free from government tampering as on the actual fairness of that process.
If citizens do not trust the referendum process, they may decide to abstain from voting
in a referendum, or even not to abide by its result. See United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (i973).
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neutrally when they speak at all. 113 While the first amendment
free exercise clause directs governments to permit private in-
dividual choice of religious beliefs, the establishment clause
demands that governments not establish any particular reli-
gious creed as official orthodoxy. 114 In the religious context,
the Court has enforced the Constitution's requirement of gov-
ernmaent neutrality as a prophylactic means of safeguarding
the voluntarism of individual religious expression and associ-
ation;1 15 in the first amendment speech context, judicial im-
position of a similar requirement would provide parallel pro-
tection for individual rights of political expression and
association. 1 16
Further justification for judicial imposition of a neutrality
requirement may be found in the "process-oriented" theory of
constitutional adjudication developed by Professor Ely.
11 7
Since United States v. Carolene Products Co. ,18 the Supreme
Court has recognized that a judge's customary duty of defer-
ence to legislative judgments 1 9 is reduced when the legislative
decisions under review "restrict[] those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
113 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (i97o); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 3o6 (1952); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (i947). See generally Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82
HARv. L. REv. 168o (i969).
114 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I.
The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 138, (i967); Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II. The Nonestablish-
ment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513 (i968) [hereinafter cited as Nonestablishment].
115 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (Harlan, J.). See also Freund,
supra note 113, at 1684; Nonestablishment, supra note 114, at 517.
116 "The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of belief and expression is
sometimes a command of neutrality." Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1327 (i97o) (footnote omitted). In Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. i (1976) (per curiam), Chief Justice Burger, concurring, recognized
that numerous legitimate parallels exist between government nonestablishment of
religion and government nonestablishment of particular political viewpoints. Id. at
248-50. See also Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech,
1976 SUp. CT. REv. i, 31-35. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 92-93 (explicitly
refusing to adopt this analogy to invalidate public funding of federal candidate cam-
paigns).
117 See generally Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Re-
view, 37 MD. L. REv. 451 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Representation-Reinforcing
Mode); Ely, supra note 16; Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impos-
sibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (,978).
11 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
119 See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 354 n.12 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
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undesirable legislation." 12 0 Professor Ely has argued that Car-
olene Products requires judges strictly to scrutinize any legis-
lative decisions which directly threaten the integrity of the
political process. 121 Because the referendum process represents
a prime means by which interest groups may seek to amend
state constitutions, repeal undesirable legislation, or otherwise
"check our government when it gets out of bounds," 122 this
theory suggests that courts may validly subject to strict scru-
tiny a municipal legislature's decision to influence a statewide
referendum result.
When a municipal legislature allocates public resources to
advocate a particular referendum result, the policies support-
ing government neutrality apply with special force. In refer-
enda and initiatives, the statewide electorate assumes a legis-
lative function by voting on measures which either the state
legislature or members of the electorate have placed on the
ballot. 123  Either the state legislature or the voters, but not
city governments, are thus empowered by state constitutions
to decide whether or not to submit a referendum proposal to
the voters. 124 Cities are usually free to lobby before the leg-
islature to prevent a measure from being put before the state-
wide electorate in referendum form.' 2s But once the state
legislature decides to entrust the final legislative decision to
the popular electorate, it explicitly removes the decision from
the hands of state or municipal officeholders. 126  Permitting
those officials to use public funds to attempt to influence the
outcome of that decision would partially return them to a role
from which they have been excluded by constitutional de-
sign. 127 Municipal governments should thus refrain from es-
120 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
121 See generally sources cited note 117 supra.
122 Representation-Reinforcing Mode, supra note 117, at 477.
123 At least 22 state constitutions expressly provide for initiatives or referenda at
the state or local level. In referenda, the legislature submits a proposal to the
electorate for approval. In initiatives, a given percentage of the electorate itself places
a legislative proposal or constitutional amendment on the ballot. See M. JEWELL &
S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 116 (3d ed.
1977).
124 To the extent that this power allocation reflects the state constitution's concern
for electoral fairness, that allocation provides a constitutional dimension to the posi-
tivistic approach not provided, for example, by the notion of dissenters' rights. See
P. 553 supra.
125 See, e.g., cases cited note 20 supra.
126 See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. No. 1,
459 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1978), discussed at note 82 supra.
127 By seeking to influence the electorate's deliberative process before it engages
in its plebiscitary legislative function, the municipality would, in effect, be circum-
venting state constitutional referendum procedures. That act would violate the spirit
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tablishing an official political viewpoint during the time that
the popular electorate, rather than its elected representatives,
makes law. 128
A hypothetical case illustrates how judges may apply the
axiom of government neutrality in the electoral process to
identify and police impermissible municipal advocacy. Sup-
pose that, following Anderson, a state passed a statute ex-
pressly authorizing cities to spend public funds to advocate
particular outcomes in statewide referenda. Under a positiv-
istic approach, the express legislative authorization would suf-
fice to validate any ensuing municipal advocacy. 129 Under a
formalistic reading of Bellotti and Buckley, the statute would
likely be superfluous since the city's expression would already
be constitutionally protected. 130 Dissenting taxpayers could
not invoke the Abood principle either to block the speech or
to withhold their tax payments,131 for state courts would likely
defer to the statute as a legislative determination that munic-
ipal advocacy constituted a valid government function or
served a public purpose. 132
The principle of government neutrality, by contrast, would
allow citizens to invoke the first amendment to regulate the
speech of their government. 133 In the case posed, all municipal
citizens, not merely dissenting taxpayers, would have consti-
of the Supreme Court's recent decisions protecting the referendum process. See, e.g.,
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Gordon v.
Lance, 403 U.S. i (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (x97i).
To some extent, selective government lecturing on political matters might also be
criticized as representing a lesser form of the government paternalism which the Court
has repeatedly rejected in recent first amendment decisions. See, e.g., Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (I977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976). Because such government lecturing
forces taxpayers first to finance, then to listen to, information which they otherwise
might not wish to hear, government lecturing enhances official control over the
people's sources of information just as selective government censorship of private
speech does. "[T]he authority of governments to restrict the liberty of citizens in
order to prevent certain harms does not include authority to prevent these harms by
controlling people's sources of information to insure that they will maintain certain
beliefs." Scanlon, supra note 2, at 222.
128 See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 217-i8, 551 P.2d I, 9-10, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 705-06 (1976); Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ., 13 N.J.
172, 98 A.2d 673 (i953); Miller v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 762, 15I Cal. Rptr. 197
(Ct. App. 1979); Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 452-53, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235,
239-40 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
'29 See p. 538 supra.
130 See p. 541 supra.
131 See p. 551 supra.
'32 See pp. 538, 553 supra.
£33 See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. No. i,
459 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Colo. 1978).
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tutional standing to challenge the municipality's speech.1 3 4
The "process-protecting" principle of neutrality would further
direct courts carefully to scrutinize both the motives underlying
the state's authorization of municipal referendum electioneer-
ing and the effects of the particular instance of electioneering
on the fairness and appearance of fairness of the referendum
process. To determine whether the municipality had engaged
in unconstitutional governmental speech, the court would need
initially to decide whether the government message had been
disseminated by means sufficiently sensitive to those para-
mount state interests. The next Section will describe such a
set of means.
B. A Constitutional Decree to Regulate Municipal
Referendum Advocacy
The Anderson court issued a broad injunction allowing the
city to disseminate facts but not opinions on the referendum;
to engage in advocacy on nonreferendum issues but not on
referendum issues; and to spend money to lobby before state
legislatures which it could not spend to speak directly to the-
public. 135 Furthermore, the court decreed that city policy-
makers could continue speaking in support of the amendment
during their working hours while indicating that nonpolicy-
making employees could not. 136
134
Strange as it must sound in appraising an amendment which explicitly
forbids abridging the freedom of speech, it is nonetheless arguable that the
function of [the first] amendment implicitly requires some silencing of the
government itself.
... If standing to complain were to be found and a more solid constitutional
basis for objection to be had, it would probably be in the theory of the first
amendment.
Van Alstyne, supra note I, at 532-33 (emphasis in original). See also T. EMERSON,
supra note I, at 7oo. Recognition that a municipality has a constitutional duty not
to establish political viewpoints would provide the "logical nexus between the status
asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated" necessary to justify a grant of
standing. Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) (granting taxpayer stand-
ing, based on first amendment establishment clause, to challenge federal spending
program), with note 85 supra. See also L. TRIBE, supra note I, § 3-22. Municipal
citizens could therefore invoke the first amendment to challenge even partisan munic-
ipal advocacy expressly authorized by state statute. In other contexts, courts have
recognized that a state's control of its municipalities should not be immune from
constitutional attack. See Case Comment, Municipal Corporation Standing to Sue
the State: Rogers v. Brockette, 93 HARV. L. REV. 586, 590 & n.31.
135 See note 6o supra. See also Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants at 18-27,
City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. io6o (1979).
136 See Anderson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 2322-23, 38o N.E.2d
628, 641 (1978).
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Though the Anderson court supported its injunction with
only sparse constitutional precedent, 137 its decree accorded
with restrictions on governmental speech upheld in a variety
of Supreme Court decisions concerned with the proper govern-
mental role in the electoral process. 1 38 Those decisions provide
state courts with closely drawn standards by which to evaluate
the constitutionality of municipal electoral advocacy. Where
a court finds government speech unconstitutional, those stan-
dards may further guide it in shaping a constitutional decree
to regulate expenditure of municipal appropriations, use of
municipal facilities, as well as the partisan political activities
of nonpolicymaking and policymaking municipal employees in
statewide referendum campaigns. 139
The constitutional principle of neutrality suggests that state
courts should regulate municipal speech according to two gen-
eral standards. First, cities should be obliged to make a "bal-
anced presentation" of the issues surrounding a specific refer-
endum question in all of their publicly financed informational
activities. The Supreme Court has imposed a similar require-
ment in its decisions mandating government evenhandedness
when administering "public forums." 140 Second, courts should
impose on municipalities a "duty to disclose" the amount,
nature, and purpose of each appropriation, transfer, or ex-
penditure of municipal funds made to inform the public about
a given referendum question. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Su-
preme Court validated analogous disclosure requirements
which had been statutorily imposed on political candi-
dates. 141 These two requirements would be effective from the
day that the legislature placed the referendum question on the
ballot until election day. In this manner, the plebiscitary leg-
137 Id.
138 See cases cited note iio supra.
139 Such a decree, which could involve the continuing active participation of a
trial judge throughout the period of a referendum campaign, would be consistent with
Professor Chayes' model of a judge's role in "public law litigation." See generally
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
140 See Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). See generally
L. TRIBE, supra note I, § 12-2 I; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. i. Some state courts have already imposed this
"balanced presentation" requirement on municipal governments that have engaged
in statewide electioneering. See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 2o6, 221-22 &
n.7, 551 P.2d 1, 12 & n.7, 23o Cal. Rptr. 697, 708 & n.7; Citizens to Protect Pub.
Funds v. Board of Educ., I3 N.J. 172, i8o-82, 98 A.2d 673, 677-78 (1953).
141 424 U.S. at 6o-84. See also Developments in the Law -Elections, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1111, 1241-54 (1975).
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islature - the electorate - could recognize a period of recep-
tivity to information about proposed legislation in much the
same way as an administrative agency recognizes particular
time periods for "notice and comment rulemaking." 142
Under these general requirements, proponents of opposing
sides of a referendum issue would be entitled to equal oppor-
tunity to participate in all publicly funded media presenta-
tions. The "public forum" decisions would additionally require
that a municipality grant all referendum advocates equal ac-
cess to municipal facilities to which any are granted
access. 143  If a city satisfied these requirements, dissenters
would have no valid grounds for complaint.1
4 4
The countervailing first amendment rights of individuals
within the government to speak on matters of public interest
would require courts to modify these two general constitutional
rules when dealing with municipal employees. Here, too, how-
ever, courts should impose restrictions on the speech of mu-
nicipal employees analogous to statutory restrictions the con-
stitutionality of which the Supreme Court has already af-
firmed. Those Supreme Court decisions upholding state and
federal Hatch Acts - legislation preventing government em-
ployees from taking "active part" in partisan political cam-
paigns 145 - and those prohibiting discharge of government
employees solely because of their political affiliation 146 have
stressed the urgency of insulating nonpolicymaking government
employees from pressure to campaign for their superiors' par-
tisan viewpoints. They jointly suggest that a state court's
regulation of nonpolicymakers' political speech would free em-
142 Cf Coven, The First Amendment Rights of Policymaking Public Employees,
12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559, 574 (I977) (acknowledging public's right to hear
its government officials immediately before elections).
,43 See cases cited note 140 supra. See also Bonner-Lyons v. School Comm., 480
F.2d 442, 444 (ist Cir. 2973); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal.
2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967). The requirement of equal access
would extend to publicly owned telephones, printed materials, auditoriums, et cetera.
144 See, e.g., 'Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ., 3 N.J. 272,
i80-82, 98 A.2d 673, 677-78 (I953) (Brennan, J.); note 82 supra.
145 Section ga of the Hatch Act prohibits federal employees from taking "an active
part in political management or in political campaigns." 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (a)(2)
(1976). The Act also restricts the political activities of state employees working in
federally financed agencies and programs. Id. § 1502. The Court has upheld the
constitutionality of § ga on two separate occasions, see United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (,973); United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), and has affirmed the constitutionality of its
state law counterparts, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 6ox (1973).
146 See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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ployees from coercion to serve in political machines.1 4 7 These
decisions thereby afford a court the constitutional basis to
regulate referendum advocacy of nonpolicymakers by issuing
a judicial decree modeled on the Hatch Act. Such a decree
would ban outright all "plainly identifiable acts" of "active
campaigning" by nonpolicymakers which occur in a certain
manner, at certain times, or in certain places. 148 To prevent
overregulation of nonpolicymakers' speech, in gray areas courts
should place the burden on those challenging municipal ad-
vocacy to demonstrate that a nonpolicymaker's acts are incom-
patible with his official responsibilities.
The court's decree, however, would have to allow policy-
making officials 149 broader latitude to speak out than it allowed
lower echelon employees. °5 0 Policymakers do not enjoy the
same protection against political dismissal which nonpolicy-
makers enjoy. 15 1 Thus, affording wider protection to their
individual first amendment rights to advocate would simulta-
neously support the public accountability of the administration
they represent while supporting the citizenry's right to hear
official expertise on referendum issues. Although policymakers
would have *the unfettered right to use their own resources to
advocate a desired result, courts could forbid them to deploy
municipal employees, public facilities, or public funds to dis-
147 United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973). In Letter Carriers, the Court deemed the state's interest in promoting
an effective and efficient civil service a compelling interest favoring restriction of
policymakers' partisan electoral advocacy. Id. at 564.
148 The Letter Carriers Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch Act's limits
on "plainly identifiable acts" of political management and political campaigning by
federal employees. In the companion case of Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 6oz
(1973), the Court declared that municipal employees could constitutionally be prohib-
ited from holding office in citizens' committees favoring political candidates, cam-
paigning door to door, working at polling places, soliciting support for certain can-
didates, and the like. Id. at 616-x7.
To prevent unconstitutional vagueness, see note 75 supra, however, courts could
incorporate into their decrees any regulations promulgated under the state Hatch
Act. Furthermore, courts could specify that the general prohibition against political
campaigning be subject to "obvious limitations" on time and place. See United States
Civil Serv. Comm'nr v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 595-97 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting). Such a test would prohibit nonpolicymaking employees from
campaigning during working hours, in public buildings, or while in uniform, for
example, while freeing them to engage in political activities on their own time or in
their own neighborhoods.
149 Policymaking employees include those officials who are appointed or elected to
executive or agency positions within the municipal government. See Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1976) (plurality opinion) (suggesting how policymakers may be
distinguished from nonpolicymakers).
,so See generally Coven, supra note 142.
's' See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367, 372 (1976).
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seminate their message.1 52 This principle of "non-concentra-
tion of resources" 153 would bar elected officials from expending
public resources to propagate personal opinions, thereby prop-
erly balancing the public's need to protect the referendum
process from abuse against its need to hear expertise which
only elected officials may possess.15 4 Because it will be diffi-
cult, on the margin, to determine when a policymaker is con-
centrating public resources to amplify his own voice, courts
should place the burden in gray areas on the policymaker to
demonstrate that a given use of municipal resources is com-
patible with his official responsibilities. 155
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to articulate constitutional prin-
ciples basic to any broad theory of governmental speech. The
positivistic analysis which state courts commonly employed to
152 This solution would eliminate many of the first amendment questions raised
when individuals spend other people's money to amplify their own voices. See pp.
543-44 Supra.
153 This principle was first suggested by Professor Cox in the context of candidate
elections. See Cox, Commentary, in FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
68, 69-70 (A. Rosenthal ed. 1972), reprinted in 3 STUDIES IN MONEY IN POLITICS
study no. I8 (H. Alexander ed. I974).
Is4 Alternatively, states may pursue a legislative solution to this problem by en-
acting statutes empowering municipalities to establish separate segregated funds for
political advocacy, similar to those provided for in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,
2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976), and numerous state statutes regulating corporate participation
in partisan candidate elections. Such a statute would permit municipal taxpayers
desirous of government advocacy on their behalf to contribute directly to a segregated
"municipal speech" fund by checking off a box on their local tax return. Contributors
could thereby specifically authorize certain municipal officials to engage in political
advocacy when the outcome of controversial statewide referendum elections would
seriously affect the municipal welfare. The feasibility of enacting such a state statute,
however, would rest in part on whether § 441b and its state law counterparts can
survive constitutional attack by business corporations after Bellotti. See generally
Birnbaum, The Constitutionality of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act After First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 149 (i979).
,ss These proposed judicial restraints on municipal referendum advocacy may
appear severe in view of the Supreme Court's invalidation of a statutory restraint on
business corporation referendum advocacy in Bellotti. But the Bellotti Court's deci-
sion to permit possible distortion of the referendum process by business corporations
cannot justify permitting additional distortion of that process through unchecked
municipal advocacy. Allowing municipalities to intervene in referendum elections on
the ground that they are correcting distortions presupposes that municipalities and
large private centers of power will always stand on opposite sides of controversial
referendum questions; yet all or even many of the various private interests adopting
the corporate form may not always choose the same side of any given referendum
question. In some cases, those individuals who exercise control over large private
corporations might also wield unusual influence over the municipal government it-
self. Moreover, if both cities and private corporations could spend without limit in
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evaluate municipal referendum advocacy prior to Anderson v.
City of Boston proves too limited in scope because it examines
only the powers granted by states to municipal speakers. The
formalistic constitutional approach which may be derived from
Buckley v. Valeo and First National Bank v. Bellotti proves
overbroad because it focuses only on the first amendment pro-
tection accorded to political speech. An analysis relying on the
rights of dissenting taxpayers proves too malleable ever to
determine whether municipalities may or may not speak. This
Note has argued that courts cannot meaningfully evaluate the
rights of cities to speak with public funds or the rights of
dissenters to block that speech without first discussing the
context in which the government speech will have its im-
pact. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court should there-
fore have decided Anderson by an analysis which considered
not merely the identity of the speaker or the nature of the
speech, but also the speaker's appropriate role in the electoral
context. Had the court applied this analysis, the state's par-
amount interest in preserving the fairness and appearance of
fairness of its electoral process would have proved sufficient
to uphold the injunction which the court issued. This Note
has argued that, in future cases, a similar decree would rep-
resent a constitutional means, closely tailored to the paramount
state interest in preserving electoral fairness, by which- courts
could regulate municipal advocacy.
Ironically, the first amendment justifies the most strenuous
restriction of governmental expression in precisely the same
context in which it most vigorously protects individual political
expression - when voters are about to go to the polls. When
municipal governments address referendum issues, courts can
and must carefully scrutinize and circumscribe their speech.
referendum campaigns, the ability of individual and minority voices to make them-
selves heard almost certainly would be reduced. See Van Alstyne, supra note x, at
532-33. Although this Note has assumed throughout the continuing vitality of the
Supreme Court's decision in Bellotti, much of the foregoing analysis strongly suggests
that the Court's reasoning in that case was overly formalistic. See pp. 542-43 and
notes 43, 48, & 154 supra. Business corporations, like municipal corporations, are
not ordinary speakers, nor is their expenditure always identical to speech. Courts
should therefore examine the Supreme Court's reasoning in Bellotti closely and apply
the narrow holding of that case with care.
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